The P5+Germany and Iran have declared last week that a tentative agreement has been reached to resolve the smouldering nuclear weapons crisis in Iran. The incentives of the putative deal would allow for staged increases in trade and capital flows tied to the demonstrable elimination of enrichment activities. Though this nuclear agreement is tentative, the likelihood is as high as it has been since at least 2003. Opportunities and risks await for Azerbaijan and the other neighbors of of Islamic State.
While they participants would be the key beneficiaries of such actions, other neighboring states may face risk and opportunity. For some of the littoral states of the Persian Gulf, increased pressure on Shi’a minorities may pose increased challenges as we are seeing in Yemen with the Zaydi Houthi minority. Others see great opportunities in Central Asia for the bordering states. Without many Shi’a, there seems to be an ideological firewall between these states and Iran, which would allow for trade, energy, and capital flows without any contagion from the more pernicious parts of Iran.
Azerbaijan faces both great opportunities and a few risks with an Iran reintegrating into the world. With oil fields getting played-out by 2030, Azerbaijan has a chance to invest in Iran. Iran needs capital and know-how, but as all of the oil majors know, a local touch and a rapport with the leadership of a host-country is nearly as important. While Azerbaijan has been trying to shift its focus to natural gas, the expertise that the State Oil Company of the Azerbaijan Republic (SOCAR) has developed in offshore oil developments could provide a windfall, allowing Azerbaijan to continue growing without falling into the middle income trap.
Another benefit from cooperation between Iran and Azerbaijan would lead to the cutting off of what the government of Azerbaijan has cited to the United Nations as "illicit trafficking of drugs and contraband via the Armenian-occupied regions surrounding the breakaway region of Nagorno-Karabakh.” According to the Azeri government, the cultivation and export of illicit drugs supports organized crime in Nagorno-Karabakh and in Armenia. As much of these drugs flow through from the occupied regions via Iran to Turkey and on to Europe, active Azerbaijani engagement with Iran could actually weaken criminal elements in their occupied regions.
Finally, some of the poorer regions of Azerbaijan which are located on its southern border. The development of these regions is hindered because of the low levels of trade. Some of these regions have sizable minority populations of Talysh, an Iranic people. By simplifying trade, Azerbaijani bazarris would be able to enrich their towns, some of which contain an important minority, while providing a human based form of development in some of the desolate areas of the country. Moreover, the tourism potential of these regions is high due to the restrictive nature of the Iranian state on alcohol and the mingling of genders. If implemented right, Azerbaijan could become a place for the rich of Iran to enjoy.
With all of theses opportunities, the threats to Azerbaijan remain. Moreover, the elite in Baku, consisting of a highly secularized cadre, remain highly skeptical of the influence of Shi’ism. Throughout Azerbaijan, there are Iranian funded Red Crescent medical centers. Devout Azeris, of whom are preponderantly Shi’a continue to go on pilgrimage in Iran. These factors will continue to weigh against any cooperation between these neighbors. Nonetheless, the strategic, developmental, and investment opportunities should not be ignored by the Aliev government which may see too many shadows instead a chance for enrichment. Windfalls are only useful if they are seized.
(silkroadreporters.com)
www.ann.az
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